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Abstract
Energy storage systems for transportation and grid applications, and in the future for aeronautical
applications, require the ability of providing accurate diagnosis to insure system availability and relia-
bility. In such applications, battery packs may consist of hundreds or thousands of interconnected cells,
and of the associated electrical/electronic hardware. This paper presents a systematic methodology for
approaching some aspects of the design of battery packs, and in particular the development of diagnostic
strategies, using cell models and structural diagnosis methods. First, the analytical redundancy that is
intrinsic in the battery system is determined. Then, graph-theoretic tools are used to construct general
structural models of two common battery pack topologies, and illustrate how the redundancy present
in different measurements (current, voltage, and temperature) can be used to improve monitoring and
diagnosis of a battery system. Possible sensor placement strategies that would enable the diagnosis of
individual sensor faults and individual cell faults for different battery topologies are analyzed as well.
While the work presented in this paper is only one step in the design of a large battery pack design, it
is an important and needed advancement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
AMONG the energy storage technologies, lithium-ion batteries (LIB) have demonstrated great
capability in improving system efficiency, emissions, management of uncontrollable sources
(e.g. renewable resources, regenerative braking), controllability and power quality, system level
reliability, delay system expansion/investments, weight, flexibility and modularity in several
energy applications. Major automotive companies around the world are researching and launching
electric vehicles [1]. The aircraft industry and federal agencies, such as NASA, have also invested
in the research on more electric aircraft that can transport both people and cargo [2]–[4].
Similarly, electric utilities are seeking to use energy storage as a cost-effective way of supporting
renewable power production and distribution [5], [6]. While LIB are characterized by high
energy/power density, negligible memory effect and low self-discharge rate when compared to
other energy storage technologies, their widespread use is usually limited by [7]–[9]: i) reliability
and durability of the performance at extreme conditions or over time; ii) design of cells and
battery systems that satisfy safety requirements; iii) complexity of large-scale battery pack; iv)
weight overhead of Battery Management System (BMS), sensing, packaging, and cooling; v)
charging rate limitation, especially when high energy density cells are considered; and vi) cost.
Nevertheless, the integration of LIB in a system usually requires that battery cells are connected
in series and/or in parallel to form modules, which then are assembled into battery packs to meet
the energy and power requirements of vehicles and grid applications, resulting in systems that
are large-dimensional and that have complex interconnections [8]. One of the open problems is
the ability to properly monitor the operation of such complex systems, and to diagnose their
health. When assembling a large battery pack, two fundamental topologies are commonly used:
parallel-series, and series-parallel [8], [10], as shown in Fig.1, where i is the series index and j
is the parallel index. A battery pack is composed by n×m cells, where n indicates the number
of elements in series and m the number of elements in parallel. The behavior of a battery pack
cannot be modeled by understanding the behavior of a single cell, as the complex interconnections
of cells and modules causes interactions that may limit the system performance. Because of
differences in cell electrical and thermal characteristics and in cell aging, the energy/power
density and the durability and safety of the battery packs will be reduced to a certain extent
compared with individual cell [11]. It is therefore very important to understand the behavior
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of large battery pack systems, which are defined by their electrical topology, by their cooling
system architecture, and by the design of their battery management system. Among them, efficient
sensing and fault tolerant design are important elements in the design of a battery pack. In this
paper we focus on one particular aspect of the battery pack system design: the ability to diagnose
faults and failures.
Fig. 1: (a) nSmP (n series of m cells in parallel), (b) mPnS (m parallels of n cells in series)
Methods for fault diagnosis for lithium-ion battery systems can be classified into model-based,
knowledge-based, and data-driven ones [12]. The most widely used knowledge-based methods
include graph theory-based (fault tree analysis) [13], expert system [14], and fuzzy logic-based
[15]. These diagnostic methods employ the basic knowledge and real-time observation of the
battery system. Although the principle is easy to understand, before the fault diagnosis decision is
made, further research is needed on the fault mechanism, knowledge acquisition and knowledge
representation. Data-driven methods include signal processing [16]–[19], machine learning [20]–
[22], and information fusion [23]. The advantage of these methods is that they can directly
analyze and process operating data to detect failures without relying on models. The limitation
in these methods is the need for large amounts of historical data, high computational costs,
and training complexity. Model based methods can be divided into three categories, including
state estimation [24]–[27], parameter estimation [28]–[31], and structural analysis theory [32]–
[34]. The development of battery models, including electrical models, thermal models and
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electrochemical models, provides the basis for model-based fault diagnosis. Due to the deeper
insights afforded by physically based methods, these approaches can not only detect faults, but
also locate faults and estimate their size. It should be noted that all of these model-based methods
may be affected by model uncertainty, interference and noise.
Diagnosis is an essential element of fault tolerance. A traditional approach to achieving fault
tolerance may include two steps: 1) detect specific faults through limit checking or some other
form of signal analysis; 2) if a failure is detected, a controller or management system will use
existing redundancy to replace the faulty component or function [35]. This approach to fault
tolerance is based on physical redundancy, where critical elements of the system are carried
out multiple times, with attendant increases in both system cost and complexity. However, this
approach may not be always feasible in large-scale systems. In this paper, the methodology used
for fault diagnosis is based on a graphical approach known as “structural analysis” [35]–[37].
Structural analysis is based on the systematic study of the analytical redundancy inherent in a
mathematical model of the system, and is especially suitable for large and nonlinear systems
because it is founded on structural system properties [35], [38]. The system structural model is
represented by a bipartite graph (usually visualized through an incidence matrix), and permits
studying the analytical redundancy (AR) inherent in the system with the aim of identifying
fault detection and isolation (FDI) strategies in a systematic way. One of the outcomes of this
approach is that it allows to evaluate the diagnosability of the system as a function of employing
different sensor sets, and also to assist in sensor placement [38]–[40].
The method of using structural analysis to study the FDI attributes of the system has been
applied to several fields, for example automotive systems [41]–[43], lithium-ion batteries [32]–
[34], engines [44], [45], fuel cells [46], transmissions [47]–[50], anti-lock brakes [51], drive
systems of electric vehicles, [52], and pneumatic systems [53]. The idea of applying structural
analysis for battery diagnosis is not novel, but while the results available in literature are useful
and interesting, they are quite limited and not generalized to large battery packs, system faults,
and sensor placement.
The contributions made in this paper may be summarized as follows: i) for the first time
the tools of structural analysis are applied in a general and systematic way to a battery pack
to understand the intrinsic redundancy contained in mathematical models of the battery cells
assembled in packs with two different topologies; ii) we develop general models, which include
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS: SYSTEMS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, AUGUST 2020 5
fault models, to determine the intrinsic redundancy of the system, in the absence of measurements
; iii) the structural models are used to assess the degree of diagnosability that can be achieved
for each topology by incorporating sensors in the battery pack design. In summary, the analysis
conducted in this paper and the methods developed in it permit evaluating trade-offs among
different sensor placement strategies for the purpose of diagnosis. The principal contribution
of this paper is a systematic methodology to understand the diagnostic implications of sensor
selections in battery packs. While the complete design of a battery pack, including sensor
selection to enable battery electrical, thermal and health management, is a complex process
that involves many other design aspects, nonetheless we believe that the work presented in this
paper is an important step in this direction.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, the tools of structural analysis are introduced
for a single cell. Section III introduces the analysis of the structural model of the battery pack.
Section IV discusses the sensors placement for faults detectability and isolability of different
pack topology. Section V reports comments and remarks. Finally conclusion is drawn in Section
VI.
II. INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF BATTERY CELLS
A. Battery pack modeling
The subject of battery pack modeling is complex, as it may require consideration of electro-
chemistry, electrical system, thermal behavior, and control (BMS that is responsible for charge
equalization, thermal management, safety etc.) [10], [54]. In this paper we are focused on
describing the systems aspects of the battery pack, and in particular the interaction between
the electrical and thermal behavior of the elements with sensing and monitoring systems. Thus,
equivalent electrical circuit models (ECMs) and lumped-parameter heat exchange models [55],
[56] are usually adopted for system level fault diagnosis, thanks to the possibility of locating
voltage, current and temperature sensors. For simplicity, a zeroth order ECM is employed as
the basis of the analysis of this paper. Note that the methodology proposed in this paper can
be extended to higher order ECMs. The equations below describe a basic electrothermal model
that captures the essential behavior of the generic ij battery cell. The model is composed of 4
constraints (c1, c2, c3, c4).
c1 : Vij = Voc,ij −RijIij (1)
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c2 :
dSoCij
dt
= − Iij
Qij
(2)
c3 : Voc,ij = f(SoCij) (3)
c4 : mcp
dTij
dt
= Rij(Iij)
2 −QTMSij (4)
where, V represents the cell terminal voltage, I represents the input current. Eq.(1) is the
calculation of state of charge (SoC) using the Coulomb counting method where, Q is the cell
capacity. The open circuit voltage (Voc) is a function of the SoC, as shown in Eq.(2). Based
conservation of energy, Eq.(3) shows the energy conservation equation of a cell including the
heat generation (RI2) and the heat extracted by the thermal management (QTMS). T is the
temperature of the cell. m represents cell mass and cp the specific heat capacity at constant
pressure. For the purpose of structural analysis, we assume that the R and Q are constant and
not dependent on SoC and T .
For the battery pack architectures shown in Fig. 1, an electrical model can be derived applying
Kirchhoff’s Laws and including a load current IBP [8]. For example, in the nSmP topology:
m∑
j=1
Iij = IIBP (i = 1 . . . n) (5)
Vi1 = · · · = Vij = · · · = Vim (∀i = 1 . . . n) (6)
For mPnS topology:
m∑
j=1
Ij = IBP (Iij = Ij ∀i = 1 . . . n) (7)
n∑
i=1
Vi1 = · · · =
n∑
i=1
Vij = · · · =
n∑
i=1
Vim (∀j = 1 . . .m) (8)
B. Structural model of battery
Structural analysis investigates the model constraint structure [35], i.e., the connections be-
tween known variables, unknown variables, and faults. No matter what type of model is used,
one can generate a corresponding structural model in the form of a bipartite graph. These
mathematical equations can be a set of algebraic equations, derivative equations or just a function
to describe the relationship between variables. A structural representation is a bipartite graph with
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Fig. 2: Bipartite graph for a single cell system.
TABLE I: Incidence matrix for a single cell system
Constraints Unknown variables
V11 Voc,11 I11 SoC11 T11
c1 1 1 1 0 0
c2 0 0 1 1 0
c3 0 1 0 1 0
c4 0 0 1 0 1
a set of system constraints, variables and edges (C, Z, and ε, respectively). The set of variables
(Z) include unknown variables (X) and known variables (K). The constraints for a single cell
are listed in Eq.s (1)-(4), where i = 1, j = 1. The model has 4 constraints C ={c1, c2, c3, c4}
and 5 unknown variables X ={V11, I11, Voc,11, SoC11, T11}. The bipartite graph of the single
cell system is shown in Fig. 2, where variables are represented by circles while the constraints
are represented by bars. An edge connects a variable and a constraint and it is not oriented. A
structural model may also be represented by a corresponding incidence matrix in which the rows
represent system constraints and the columns represent variables. The elements of the incidence
matrix are defined as follows: if a variable appears in a constraint, the element is 1, otherwise
0. The incidence matrix of the single cell system is shown in Table I.
C. Matching on a structural model
The basic principle of structural analysis is to find matchings, that is, causal assignments
between unknown variables and the constraints in a structural model. If an unknown variable
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Fig. 3: Two complete matchings (a) , (b) and an incomplete matching (c)
is matched with a constraint, it can be calculated from this constraint. If an unknown variable
is not matched, it cannot be calculated. If there are multiple ways for unknown variables to
be matched, the resulting analytical redundancy can potentially be used for fault detection and
isolation. An accurate definition of matching can be found in [35]. Basically, if we employ
bipartite graph as the structural model, a matching is a subset of ε. Any two edges in a matching
do not share common node (C or Z), which means it associates one constraint with one specific
variable. Matching is not unique, as different matchings may be found for a system. Fig. 3 lists
three possible matchings for the single cell system. The black thinner lines represent unmatched
edges, while the red bold lines represent matched edges. A matching can be further defined as
a complete matching based on the number of edges (|ε|), constraints (|C|), and variables (|Z|)
contained in the matching. A matching is said to be : i) complete with respect to C if |ε| = |C|;
ii) complete with respect to Z if |ε| = |Z|; iii) if only unknown variables (X) are considered, a
matching is said to be complete if |ε| = |X|. In Fig. 3, (a) and (b) are two complete matchings
with respect to constraints; (c) is an incomplete matching.
When no measurement is considered, a single cell system has X = 5 and C = 4, thus a
complete matching can be find only with respect to constraints. In fact, the system of Eq.s
(1)-(4) cannot be solved to calculate the 5 unknown variables. Thus, the intrinsic analytical
redundancy (IAR) of a single cell is −1.
IARsingle cell = −1 (9)
The addition of a sensor to measure an unknown variable X increases the number of known
variables and constraints, however it introduces the possibility of a fault, as shown in the
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Fig. 4: (a) an example of complete matching, (b) matching in the bipartite graph
following equation:
yu = u+ fyu (10)
where y denotes the real time sensor reading and is a known variable, fyu denotes the sensor
fault (f 6= 0 indicates that the sensor failed). u is the actual value of the sensed current, voltage
or temperature.
As example, a complete matching of the system of Eq.s (1)-(4) can be achieved by adding
the following constraints to measure current and voltage of the single cell:
c5 : yI11 = I11 + fyI11 (11)
c6 : yV1 = V11 + fyV11 (12)
The model includes 6 constraints and 5 unknown variables. The degree of the analytical
redundancy (AR) becomes 1 and a complete matching with respect to unknown variables can
be found, as shown in Fig. 4(a). Matching can be reflected on bipartite graph, see Fig. 4(b). The
red lines represent the matched edges, blue circles represent known variables and red circles
represent faults.
ARsingle cell = 1 when ∃ yI11 and yV11 (13)
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Fig. 5: Oriented graph for single cell system with a current and a voltage measurement
D. Oriented graph
An oriented graph is a matching that assigns orientation of some edges. For matched constraint,
the edge that connects the matched variable and the constraint is called a matched edges whose
orientation is from the constraint to the variable. Other edges that connects the non-matched
variables and the constraint are called non-matched edges with an orientation from non-matched
variables to the constraint. For constraint that is not matched, all edges’ orientation are from
variables to the constraint. The non-matched constraints generate a zero output, which represents
analytic redundant relations (ARRs) of the model. ARRs are used to generate residuals as fault
indicators for the purpose of fault diagnosis. Fig. 5 shows the oriented structural graph for a
single cell system.
The oriented graph defines a set of computational sequences S = {S1, S2, S3} to calculate the
unknown variables:
S1 = {(c5, I11) , (c2, SoC11) , (c3, Voc,11)}
S2 = {(c5, I11) , (c4, T11)}
S3 = {(c6, V11)}
where, the pair (c, x) means variable x is computed from constraint c. The order of the pairs
defines a computational sequence. Note that c2 and c4 are differential equations, and when we
use their integral causalities, the knowledge of initial values are required. The oriented graph
results in an alternated chain that starts from the known variables and alternates successively
between two nodes [35]. For the oriented graph shown in Fig. 5, the alternated chain based on
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS: SYSTEMS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, AUGUST 2020 11
the computational sequence S1 can be expressed as:
yI11 → c5 → I11 → c2 → SOC11 → c3 → Voc,11 (14)
Based on the alternated chain, the structural reachability is defined as [35]: a variable z2 is
reachable from a variable z1 if there exists an alternated chain from z1 to z2 . The circle in
gray represent the ARR of the model. In Fig. 5, c1 is the ARR for a single cell system with the
matching we choose in Fig. 4. A residual based on the sensor set {yI11 , yV11} that is capable of
detecting the two faults {fyI11 , fyV11} is
r = yV11 − f [SoC11,0 −
1
Q
∫ t
0
yI11(t)dt] +RyI11 = fyV11 +RfyI11 (15)
where, SoC11,0 represents the initial value of SoC11. The residual r in Eq.(15) is obtained by
substituting all matched constraints to c1 to eliminate unknown variables and make it only contain
known variables. A violation of any constraint that is used to generate the residual will result
in a non-zero residual indicating a fault. In fact, the residual in Eq.(15) is the only residual
generator for a single cell with current and voltage measurements. When there isn’t a fault, r
should be 0. Notice that this residual is sensitive to both fyI11 and fyV11 .
III. EXTENDING THE STRUCTURAL MODEL TO BATTERY MODULES AND PACKS
As discussed previously, the intrinsic analytical redundancy of a single cell is −1 (Eq. (9)).
In the same way, the intrinsic analytical redundancy (IAR) of the battery system is also -1 for
both nSmp and mPnS topologies, when no sensors and faults are considered.
IARbattery pack = −1 (16)
To increase the analytical redundancy and provide the ability to design diagnostic algorithms, sen-
sors are needed in the battery system. In this section, we use graph-theoretic tools to understand
how different measurements (current, voltage, and temperature) can add analytical redundancy to
the system, and how this analytical redundancy is linked to system diagnosability. Based on the
general structural models of the two common battery pack topologies, their intrinsic properties
are analyzed, also in the presence of faulty cells.
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Fig. 6: Oriented structural graph of a single cell (a) with one current measurement (b) with one
temperature measurement, (c) with one voltage measurement, (d) with one current measurement
and one voltage measurement.
A. Single cell
The structural model of a single cell represented by a bipartite graph is shown in Fig. 2.
Without sensing, we cannot solve for the unknown variables. If we have a current measurement
or temperature measurement for a single cell, the resulting structural graph is shown in Fig.
6(a) and (b), respectively. Every unknown variable is easily reachable from the measurement
(known) because an alternated chain can be found to exist for both cases. If we introduce a
voltage measurement for a single cell, then the structural graph is as shown in Fig. 6(c). Notice
that in this case, the three constraints {c1, c2, c3} form a loop which requires the three constraints
to be solved simultaneously. While it is true that in the case of a voltage measurement we can still
calculate all unknown variables, it is not as easy to compute these variables as was the case with
a current or a temperature measurement. This indicates that, in principle, current and temperature
sensors can provide cell information with less computational work compared to voltage sensor.
If both current and voltage measurements are available, all the unknown variables are easily
reachable, see Fig. 6(d). The redundancy of the single cell system becomes 1, which means
there will be an ARR that can be used for fault diagnosis.
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B. nSmP versus mPnS
Fig. 7: Simplification of structural model for one cell
The nSmP and mPnS topologies are shown in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b), respectively. The system
equations are listed in Eq.(1)-(8). The number of equations is always 1 less than the number of
unknown variables which indicates that the intrinsic redundancy of the battery system is -1 for
both topologies.
Based on the battery pack model, the calculation of SoC, Voc and T for one cell is isolated
from another cell. There are only current and voltage connections between cell to cell, and it
is reasonable to condense the structural graph of each single cell to one node, as shown in Fig.
7. With the simplified graph structure, it is possible to obtain a generalized structural model of
the mPnS and nSmP topologies as shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, respectively. These generalized
structural models can help analyze the effect of a faulty cell (for example a short circuit), or
the effect of cell-to-cell variation (for example due to uneven aging of cells). Given a fixed
load current and considering that cell11 in Module 1 has anomalous behavior compared to the
other cells (again, due to a fault or to a change in some physical parameter). For the nSmP
topology, all module currents equal the pack current (see Fig. 1(a)) and remain unchanged. As
shown in Fig. 8, any defect in cell11 will result in an imbalance between I11, · · · , I1j, · · · , I1m,
in Module 1. The impact of the defective cell is limited to the module it belongs to and the
other modules will not be affected by the defective cell. In the mPnS topology, the current in
each module is equal to the individual cell current, and the pack current is the summation of
all the module currents (see Fig. 1(b)). The variation of cell11 will affect I11 and IM1 . Then the
change of IM1 will cause unbalance between I
M
1 , · · · , IMj , · · · , IMm . The influence of a defective
cell will therefore spread to the whole battery pack, as shown in Fig. 9. This is a very important
intrinsic property of the two battery pack topologies, and it motivates the analysis and models
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Fig. 8: Structural model for nSmP (V Mi represent the voltage of the ith module)
Fig. 9: Structural model for mPnS (IMj represent the current of the jth module)
presented in the following section. Note that, we only apply the simplification shown in Fig.
7 to the bipartite graphs of nSmP and mSnP topologies. The sensor placement analysis in the
following section is based on using the system incidence matrix without any simplification.
IV. SENSOR PLACEMENT FOR FAULT DETECTABILITY AND ISOLABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we develop a systematic methodology to find the minimal sensor sets that can
potentially provide the two common battery topologies with enough ARRs to develop diagnostic
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS: SYSTEMS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, AUGUST 2020 15
algorithms that can achieve complete isolation for all the faults we have considered so far. In
other words, with the sensor installation guide developed in this section, it is possible to design
algorithms to generate residuals, each sensitive to a unique fault.
Fig. 10: Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition of a structural model [44]
Fault detectability of a system model can be determined by performing a Dulmage-Mendelsohn
(DM) decomposition of the system incidence matrix, which divides the structural model into
three subsystems: under-determined (M−), just-determined (M0), and over-determined (M+)
[36], as shown in Fig.10. If the incidence matrix has no over-determined subsystem, then it is
not possible to detect or isolate any faults.
As discussed in Section II and III, if sensors are not included in a battery system (whether
consisting of a single cell or of mPnS and nSmP topologies), the system is under-determined
(Eqs. (9) and (16)), and there is no analytical redundancy in it to permit diagnosis. It is clear, then,
that sensors are necessary to achieve analytical redundancy in a battery pack. As example, by
adding two sensors the system will have an over-determined subsystem. The addition of different
sensor types in different locations will result in the generation of different over-determined
subsystems. Different combinations of sensors and the presence of different faults will give
rise to different fault detectability properties, and it may take more than two sensors to insure
detectability of all faults. If faults are detectable by adding the appropriate sensors, it will then
possible to generate a residual, that is, a signal used as a fault indicator that is sensitive to these
faults. Based on the DM decoposition of the system incidence matrix, a fault is structurally
detectable if the equation containing the fault variable is in the over-determined part of the
system [38]. A second property of interest is fault isolability, defined as follows [57]: fault fi is
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isolable from fault fj , if there exists a residual that is sensitive to fi but not fj . If we look back
to Eq.(15), it can be found that in a single cell instrumented with a current sensor and a voltage
sensor, the two sensor faults are detectable but are not isolable from each other. Based on the
DM decoposition, if fault fi is to be structurally isolable from fault fj , the equations containing
these two faults must be in different equivalence classes of the over-determined subsystem. A
more detailed explanations of equivalence classes may be found in [44].
Detectability and isolability analysis can be easily performed using the Structural Analysis
Toolbox developed by Frisk et al. [45]. In the next subsection, the faults considered in this study
are introduced and a fault detectability and isolability analysis is performed for a single cell, the
generalized nSmP and mPnS topologies.
A. Battery modeling with faults
A battery pack can exhibit anomalous behavior due to many reasons, including short circuit
(internal or external to the cell), resistance increase and/or capacity fade due to accelerated aging,
sensor fault, or BMS fault [58]. In this work, two types of faults are considered: sensor fault
and short circuit faults; these may occur at the cell or module level in the battery pack. Short
circuit faults are especially important because, unlike other anomalies that would still permit the
system to operate (e.g. battery degradation), a short circuit may lead to thermal runaway and
result in a catastrophic failure.
Fig. 11: Diagram of internal and external short circuit in a cell
Short circuit faults (internal and external) are depicted in the circuit diagram of Fig. 11. The
internal short circuit is represented by a parallel resistance (RscI) connected to the cell [29]. The
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external short circuit is similarly represented by a parallel resistance (RscE) externally connected
to a cell or a module. The fault model for internal short circuit is given by:
IscI,ij =
(
Vij
RscI
)
fscI,ij (17)
where, fscI,ij represents the internal short circuit current fault and is a binary variable with
value 1 when the fault is present, and IscE,ij the internal short circuit current. In the case of an
internal short circuit, Eq. (3) remains the same while Eq.s (1), (2),and (4) result in the following
equations (18)-(20).
Vij = Voc,ij −Rij(Iij + IscI,ij) (18)
dSoCij
dt
= −(Iij + IscI,ij)
Qij
(19)
mcp
dTij
dt
= Rij(Iij + IscI,ij)
2 −QTMSij (20)
The fault model for the external short circuit is:
IscE =
(
VE
RscE
)
fscE (21)
where, fscE (a binary variable) represent the external short circuit fault, and IscE the external
short circuit current. When we consider a module, that is the composition of multiple cells, then
the voltage VE across the short circuit resistance RscE depends on how many cells are shorted
by the external short circuit. For example, as shown in Fig. 13 and 14 later, if we consider the
external short circuit at the module level, for the external short circuit in Module i in nSmP
topology, VE,i = Vi1 = · · · = Vij = · · · = Vim; for the external short circuit in Module j in
mPnS topology, VE,j = V1j + · · ·+ Vij + · · ·+ Vnj . IscE will appear in the KCL equations, (Eq.
(5) or (7)). For example, for a single cell system as shown in Fig.11, the external short circuit
fault can be modeled as:
IscE,11 =
(
V11
RscE
)
fscE,11 (22)
I11 = IBP + IscE,11 (23)
The redundancy of the battery system model with short circuit faults remains −1, because the
addition of an unknown variable to the system is balanced by the introduction of a new equation.
Sensor faults modeling was introduced in Section II.C, see Eq.10.
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B. Fault detectabilty and isolability analysis and sensor placement for single cell
The mathematical model of a single cell system with faults is shown in Eq.s (3), (18)-(20),
(22) and (23) with i = 1, j = 1. The set of short circuit faults that are included in the model
is {fscI,11, fscE,11}. The set of sensor faults depends on what sensors are added to the battery
system. For the single cell system, the possible sensor positions are {IBP , I11, V11, T11}.
TABLE II: Fault detectability and isolability matrix without sensor and with one sensor (ND=Non
Detectable; NA=Non Applicable)
fscI,11 fscE,11 fyIBP fyI11 fyV11 fyT11
no sensor ND ND NA NA NA NA
{yIBP } ND ND ND NA NA NA
{yI11} ND ND NA ND NA NA
{yV11} ND ND NA NA ND NA
{yT11} ND ND NA NA NA ND
TABLE III: Fault detectability and isolability matrix with two sensors (ND=Not Detectable;
D=Detectable; NI=Not Isolable; NA=Not Applicable; )
fscI,11 fscE,11 fyIBP
fyI11 fyV11 fyT11
{yI11 , yV11} D,NI ND NA D,NI D,NI NA
{yI11 , yT11} D,NI ND NA D,NI NA D,NI
{yV11 , yT11} D,NI ND NA ND D,NI D,NI
{yIBP , yI11} D,NI D,NI D,NI D,NI NA NA
{yIBP , yV11} D,NI D,NI D,NI NA D,NI NA
{yIBP , yT11} D,NI D,NI D,NI NA NA D,NI
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Fig. 12: DM decompositions of 1S1P battery system with (a) no sensor or with sensor set: (b)
{yIBP }, (c) {yI11 , yV11}, (d) {yIBP , yV11}, (e) {yI11 , yV11 , yIBP ,}, (f) {yI11 , yV11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2}
Table II shows the fault detectability and isolability matrix for the single cell system without
sensors, and with only one sensor. It can be seen that all faults cannot be detectable with a
single sensor. The DM decomposition shown in Fig. 12(a) and (b) show that with no sensor, the
system is under-determined (7 equations and 8 unknowns) and with one sensor (choose sensor
{yIBP } as an example), the system becomes just-determined.
Table III shows the fault detectability and isolability matrix for the single cell system with 2
sensors. There are 6 possible sensor sets. With sensor sets {yI11 , yV11}, {yI11 , yT11}, {yV11 , yT11},
all the internal short circuit faults and sensor faults are detectable, while the external short
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circuit fault is not. As shown in the DM-decomposition result (choose sensor set {yI11 , yV11} as
an example, shown in Fig. 12(c)): the equation containing the external short circuit fault signal
(fscE,11) is in the just-determined part, which means fscE,11 is not detectable. Equations containing
fault signals fscE,11, fyI11 , fyV11 are in the over-determined part and in the same equivalence class
(gray box). Thus, these three faults are detectable but not isolable from each other. Table III
shows that with the other three sensor sets {yIBP , yI11}, {yIBP , yV11}, {yIBP , yT11} all faults can
be detectable, but are also not isolable. The DM-decomposition results of one of these sensor set
illustrates this as well (choose sensor set {yIBP , yV11} as an example, shown in Fig. 12(d)): all
the equations containing fault signals are in the over-determined part, which indicates all faults
can be detectable. However, all equations containing fault signals are in the same equivalence
class, which indicates that these faults are not isolable from each other.
TABLE IV: Fault detectability and isolability matrix with three sensors (ND=Not Detectable;
D=Detectable; NI=Not Isolable; I=Isolable; UI=Uniquely Isolable; NA=Not Applicable; )
fscI,11 fscE,11 fyIBP
fyI11 fyV11 fyT11
{yI11 , yV11 , yT11} D,UI ND NA D,UI D,UI D,UI
{yI11 , yV11 , yIBP } D,UI D,I D,I D,UI D,UI NA
{yI11 , yT11 , yIBP } D,UI D,I D,I D,UI NA D,UI
{yV11 , yT11 , yIBP } D,UI D,I D,I NA D,UI D,UI
Table IV shows the fault detectability and isolability matrix for the 1S1P system with 3
sensors. With sensor set {yI11 , yV11 , yT11}, all faults can be detectable except for the external short
circuit fault. With sensor sets {yI11 , yV11 , yIBP },{yI11 , yT11 , yIBP },{yV11 , yT11 , yIBP }, all faults are
detectable. The internal short circuit fault and all sensor faults can be uniquely isolable, while
the external short circuit fault and the load current sensor fault can be isolable from other faults
but these two faults cannot be isolated from one another. From the DM-decomposition result
(choose sensor set {yI11 , yV11 , yIBP } as an example, shown in Fig. 12(e)), it can be seen that: all
faults are located in the over-determined part. The equations containing fault signals fscE,11 and
fyIBP are in the same equivalence class, which means they are not isolable from each other but
they are isolable from other faults. The equations containing fault signals fscI,11, fyI11 , fyV11 are
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TABLE V: Fault detectability and isolability matrix with four sensors (ND=Not Detectable;
D=Detectable; NI=Not Isolable; UI=Uniquely Isolable; NA=Not Applicable; )
fscI,11 fscE,11 fyIBP1 fyI11 fyV11 fyT11 fyIBP2
{yI11 , yV11 , yT11 , yIBP } D,UI D,I D,I D,UI D,UI D,UI NA
{yI11 , yV11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2} D,UI D,UI D,UI D,UI D,UI NA D,UI
{yI11 , yT11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2} D,UI D,UI D,UI D,UI NA D,UI D,UI
{yV11 , yT11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2} D,UI D,UI D,UI NA D,UI D,UI D,UI
in the different equivalence classes which means these faults can be uniquely isolable.
Table V shows the fault detectability and isolability matrix for the single cell system with 4
sensors. With sensor set {yI11 , yV11 , yT11 , yIBP }, all faults can be detectable. The internal short
circuit fault and all sensor faults can be uniquely isolable, while the external short circuit
fault and the load current sensor fault can be isolable from other faults but these two faults
cannot be isolated from each other. From the table it can be seen that {yI11 , yV11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2},
{yI11 , yT11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2}, {yV11 , yT11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2} are minimal sensor sets achieving fault isolabil-
ity. From the DM-decomposition result (choose sensor set {yI11 , yV11 , yIBP1 , yIBP2} as an example,
shown in Fig. 12(f)), it can be seen that all faults are in the over-determined part and each fault
is in a unique equivalence class, which means every fault is uniquely isolable from other faults.
In this section, we have illustrated the fault detectability and isolability for a single cell system
with all possible sensor combinations. In the following sections, we focus on the minimal sensor
sets that can achieve complete fault isolability for a battery pack.
C. Generalized nSmP topology
We begin with the generalized nSmP topology of Fig. 1(a). In general, the set of sensor faults
that needs to be diagnosed depends on the selected sensor set. Further, every single cell has the
possibility of suffering from an internal short circuit. To represent internal short circuit faults at
the cell level, every cell in both battery pack topologies is modeled with an internal short circuit
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fault signal in it, as shown in Figs. 13 and 14. The set of internal short circuit faults we seek
to diagnose is {fscI,11, · · · , fscI,ij, · · · , fscI,nm,}, for either topology. As for modeling external
short circuit faults, the fault models will vary with each topology.
Fig. 13: Diagram of internal and external short circuit for nSmP battery pack topology
Fig. 14: Diagram of internal and external short circuit for mPnS battery pack topology
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS: SYSTEMS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, AUGUST 2020 23
A generalized diagram including internal and external short circuit faults for the nSmP
topology is shown in Fig. 13. Note that, we only discuss cases when m > 1, which means
in each module there are at least two cells in parallel.
TABLE VI: Summary of the minimal sensor set to achieve fault isolability for nSmP topology
(n > 0,m > 1) (Z represents current or temperature)
# of module Topology Sensor set # of sensors # of choices
n=1
1S2P {yIBP1 , yIBP2 , yZ11 , yZ12} 2 + 1× 2 22
1S3P {yIBP1 , yIBP2 , yZ11 , yZ12 , yZ13} 2 + 1× 3 23
...
...
...
...
1SmP {yIBP1 , yIBP2 , yZ11 , · · · , yZ1j , · · · , yZ1m} 2 + 1×m 2m
n=2
2S2P {yIBP , yZ11 , yZ12 , yZ21 , yZ22} 1 + 2× 2 22m
...
...
...
...
2SmP {yIBP , yZ11 , · · · , yZij , · · · , yZ2m} 1 + 2×m 22m
n>2
3S2P {yZ11 , yZ12 , yZ21 , yZ22 , yZ31yZ32} 3× 2 23m
...
...
...
...
3SmP {yZ11 , · · · , yZij , · · · , yZ3m} 3m 23m
...
...
...
...
nSmP {yZ11 , · · · , yZij , · · · , yZnm} nm 2nm
Every module has the possibility to suffer from external short circuit, as shown in Fig. 13. The
set of external short circuit faults that needs to be diagnosed is {fscE,1, fscE,2, · · · , fscE,i, · · · , fscE,n,}.
The possible sensor positions are {IBP , u11, · · · , uij, · · · , unm}, where u represents current,
voltage or temperature of each cell. Table VI lists the minimal sensor set to achieve fault
isolability for nSmP topology. In order to uniquely isolate each fault, the sensor set installation
needs to meet both of the following two requirements:
1) each cell should be equipped with a sensor Z which can measure current or temperature;
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2) two sensors to measure the load current IBP when n = 1; one sensor to measure the load
current when n = 2; no sensor is needed to measure the battery pack current when n > 2.
The number of load current sensor varies with n. This is true because as the battery pack scales
up, the variable IBP will be contained in a greater number of equations (instances of KCL), see
Appendix A.A. As a result, the redundancy of IBP increases automatically without the need of
sensor.
D. Generalized mPnS topology
A generalized diagram including internal and external short circuit faults for the mPnS
topology is shown in Fig. 14. Note that we only consider cases when n > 1, which means
in each module there are at least two cells in series. For mPnS topology, if more than one
module suffers from an external short circuit, it is not possible to isolate these external short
circuits from one other. So, when we perform the sensor placement for fault isolability, only
one external short circuit is considered in the pack, and therefore only one external short circuit
fault {fscE,j} is to be diagnosed. If Module j is suffering from an external short circuit, all cells
in this faulty module are shorted by this fault as shown in Fig. 14. Since every module has
the possibility of experiencing an external short circuit, we find the minimal sensor set that can
achieve faults isolability regardless the location of external short circuit. For the mPnS topology,
the possible sensor positions are {IBP , u11, · · · , uij, · · · , unm}. u represents current, voltage or
temperature.
Table VII lists the minimal sensor set to achieve fault isolability for mPnS topology regardless
the location of external short circuit fault signal. To uniquely isolate each fault, the sensor set
installation needs to meet the following two requirements at the same time:
1) when m = 1, each cell should be equipped with one sensor Y which can measure voltage
or temperature; when m > 1, in each module, n−1 cells should be equipped with a sensor
Y which can measure voltage or temperature. These n− 1 cells can be chosen arbitrarily
from the n cells in each module;
2) duplicate sensors to measure the load current IBP .
As explained for the case of nSmP topology, the need of multiple load current measurements
depends on how many times the variable IBP appears in equations. Since in the equations of
the mPnS topology, IBP appears only once (see Appendix A.B), two load current sensors are
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TABLE VII: Summary of the minimal sensor set to achieve fault isolability for mPnS topology
(n > 1,m > 0) (Y represents voltage or temperature)
# of module Topology Sensor set # of sensors # of choices
m=1
1P2S {yIBP1 , yIBP2 , yY11 , yY21} 2 + 1× 2 22
1P3S {yIBP1 , yIBP2 , yY11 , yY21 , yY31} 2 + 1× 3 23
...
...
...
...
1PnS {yIBP1 , yIBP2 , yY11 , · · · , yYi1 , · · · , yYn1} 2 + 1× n 2n
m>1 mPnS
{yIBP1 , yIBP2 ,
m∑
j=1
Aj}
Bj = {Yij}, i = 1, · · · , n
Aj ⊆ Bj and there are (n− 1) elements in Aj
2 +m× (n− 1)
2n−1 ×

n− 1
n


m
needed to achieve complete fault isolation. If two mPnS packs are connected in series, only one
load current sensor is needed. If more than two mPnS packs are connected in series, a load
current sensor is no longer necessary because of the redundancy of IBP intrinsically contained
in the equations (instances of KCL).
V. FINAL COMMENTS AND REMARKS
The methodology for battery pack fault diagnosis illustrated in this paper is based on un-
derstanding and exploiting the analytical redundancy in the system. The analytical redundancy
required for fault diagnosis is in part inherently present in the analytical equations of the system,
and in part added by installing sensors, which, in the context of structural analysis, convert
unknown variables into known variables and help us determine which variables play a key role
in diagnosing the faults.
The minimal sensor set to achieve internal short circuit fault isolation is an intrinsic character-
istics of each topology. For the nSmP topology, the cells in each module are in parallel so they
share the same voltage. Thus only by adding current or temperature sensor can we achieve fault
isolation at the cell level. For mPnS topology, the cells in each module are in series so there is
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only one current. Thus, only voltage or temperature sensors can add redundancy to permit fault
isolation at the cell level. This duality is a natural consequence of series vs. parallel circuits. On
the other hand, temperature sensors can be effective in both topologies, as they are in principle
sensitive to the heat generation caused by an internal short circuit. On the contrary, in our models,
the external short circuit does not play a role in the heat balance equation. While temperature
sensors could in principle be very useful, it is not practical to install temperature sensors in each
cell due to: i) their slow dynamic response; ii) their cost; and iii) the difficulty in physically
mounting the sensors at the manufacturing stage. Today, the most common sensor set for battery
packs used in automotive applications includes [59]: i) a load current sensor to measure IBP ; ii)
voltage sensors for each cell to permit voltage balancing and overcharge protection functions in
the BMS (in the nSmP topology cells that are in parallel share a single voltage sensor, in the
mPnS topology each cell has its own voltage sensor); iii) a temperature sensor per module. In
this paper, we refer to these sensor sets as the traditional ones. To evaluate the diagnosability for
traditional sensor set, thermal model at module level is needed to provide a module temperature
variable (TM ) to permit place a temperature sensor per module.
Thermal model for Module i in nSmP topology:
TMi =
1
m
m∑
j=1
kijTij (24)
Thermal model for Module j in mPnS topology:
TMj =
1
n
n∑
i=1
kijTij (25)
Where kij represents the weighted average temperature of the module and it depends on the
distance between the ijth cell and the temperature sensor. This model assumes that thermal
connections among cells follow the same architecture of the electrical connections within the
module, and that there is no thermal interaction between modules.
An nSmP battery pack with a traditional sensor set has the ability to detect all faults. As for
isolability, a traditional sensor set can isolate faults in a module from faults in another module
while it fails to isolate every fault within the module (at the cell level). For example, Fig. 15
shows the fault isolability matrix of a 3S3P topology battery pack with a traditional sensor
set. It can be seen that the battery pack current sensor fault can be uniquely isolated from the
other faults, while faults in Modules 1, 2 and 3 are isolable from each other but faults within
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the module cannot be uniquely isolated. In each module, module voltage sensor fault, module
temperature sensor fault and external short circuit fault are isolated from each other, while they
are all not isolated from the three internal short circuit. The three internal short circuit faults are
not isolable from each other. If the 3S3P topology battery pack were equipped with the minimal
sensor set {yI11 , yI12 , yI13 , yI21 , yI22 , yI23 , yI31 , yI32 , yI33} resulting from the analysis done in this
paper, all faults could be uniquely isolated from each other. However, the minimal sensor set
does not include voltage sensors, which suggests that in a nSmP battery pack equipped with
only the minimal sensor set, the BMS would not be able to perform voltage balancing.
Fig. 15: Fault isolability matrix of 3S3P topology battery pack with traditional sensor set
{yIBP , yVM1 , yVM2 , yVM3 , yTM1 , yTM2 , yTM3 }
For a mPnS topology battery pack with the traditional sensor set, the faults in each cell can
be uniquely isolated. The battery pack current sensor fault and the external short circuit fault
cannot be isolated from each other, but can be isolated from the other faults. In each module, the
temperature sensor fault is not isolable from the internal short circuit faults. Similarly, we choose
3P3S as an example and assume that the external short circuit is in Module 1. Fig. 16 shows
the fault isolability matrix of 3P3S topology with the traditional sensor set. It can be seen that
the load current sensor fault and external short circuit fault fall in the same equivalent class and
cannot be isolated from each other. Internal short circuit fault in each cell are isolated from each
other while in each module, the module temperature sensor fault is not isolable from the three
internal short circuit faults. If the 3P3S topology battery pack were installed with the minimal
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Fig. 16: Fault isolability matrix of 3P3S topology battery pack with traditional sensor set
{yIBP , yTM1 , yTM2 , yTM3 , yV11 , yV21 , yV31 , yV12 , yV22 , yV32 , yV13 , yV23 , yV33}
sensor set {yIBP1 , yIBP2 , yV11 , yV12 , yV21 , yV22 , yV31 , yI32} derived in this paper, all faults could be
uniquely isolated from each other. Note that in the minimal sensor set case two instead of three
voltage sensors are sufficient for each module (series string) to achieve fault isolation, no matter
in which module the external short circuit fault occurs. Note further that this reduces the total
sensor count to 8, instead of 13. This reduction in sensor count would be more prominent as
the number of cells in the pack increases. On the other hand, this sensor configuration may not
be optimal from a voltage balancing perspective.
Finally, it should be pointed out that as long as the sensor set selected in a pack design includes
as a subset the minimal diagnostic sensor set for isolability derived in this paper, multiple design
objectives can be met.
VI. CONCLUSION
The work presented in this paper uses the tools of structural analysis for diagnosis to derive
some fundamental characteristics of two principal battery pack topologies from a diagnostic
perspective. The equivalent circuit models and lumped-parameter heat exchange models used
to represent each cell permit the determination of the analytical redundancy that is intrinsic in
the battery system (always -1 regardless of pack topology and number of cells). The methods
developed in this work are first applied to the simplest representation (a single cell) to illustrate
how one can select a minimal sensor set to achieve detectability and isolability of faults, and are
then generalized to the nSmP and mPnS topologies to yield results that are generally applicable
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to either topology regardless of cell number. Further, the model and methods applied to a single
cell can be applied in exactly the same way at the module level, regardless of the module
internal configuration, thus making this approach completely scalable - a property that is very
important when one considers applications with hundreds or thousands of individual cells, such
as in automotive, aerospace and grid support applications.
While the work presented in this paper is only one step in the design of a large battery
pack design, it is an important and needed advancement. For future work, we are interested
in exploring the system observability index criteria associated with different measurements to
better select optimal sensor sets that would permit meeting diagnostic requirements while also
considering constraints in sensor cost and ease of installation, as well as the requirements of the
battery management system.
APPENDIX A
A. Model for nSmP topology battery pack with faults:
n > 0;m > 1; i = 1, · · · , n; j = 2, · · · ,m
c1 : Vij = Voc,ij −Rij(Iij + IscI,ij)
c2 :
dSoCij
dt
= − (Iij+IscI,ij)
Qij
c3 : Voc,ij = f(SoCij)
c4 : mcp
dTij
dt
= Rij((Iij + IscI,ij))
2 −QTMSij
c5 : IscI,ij =
(
Vij
RscI
)
fscI,ij
c6 : IscE,i =
(
Vi1
RscE
)
fscE,i
c7 : Ii1 + Ii2 + · · ·+ Iij = IBP + IscE,i
e8 : Vi1 = Vi2 = · · · = Vij
B. model for mPnS topology battery pack with faults:
m > 0;n > 1; i = 2, · · · , n; j = 1, · · · ,m
c1 : Vij = Voc,ij −Rij(Iij + IscI,ij)
c2 :
dSoCij
dt
= − (Iij+IscI,ij)
Qij
c3 : Voc,ij = f(SoCij)
c4 : mcp
dTij
dt
= Rij((Iij + IscI,ij))
2 −QTMSij
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c5 : IscI,ij =
(
Vij
RscI
)
fscI,ij
c6 : V1j + · · ·+ Vij + · · ·+ Vnj = V Mj
c7 : I1j = · · · = Iij = · · · = Inj = IMj
c8 : I
M
1 + · · ·+ IMj + · · ·+ IMm = IBP
c9 : V
M
1 = · · · = V Mj = · · · = V Mm
If Module j suffers from the external short circuit as shown in Fig.14, c7 should be substituted
by c10 and c11.
c10 : IscE,j =
(
V1j+···+Vij+···+Vnj
RscE
)
fscE,j
c11 : I1j = · · · = Iij = · · · = Inj = IMj + IscE,j
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